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11 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) applied to 2 person static games with complete information
and homogeneous population has been widely discussed in the literature since Maynard Smith
and Price (1973) introduced the key concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Although
the latter is a more robust concept than the Nash equilibrium (NE), the main drawback is
that, like the NE, ESS is a static concept and game theorists do not provide an answer on
how the ESS is achieved or which one is selected when, like in the classic coordination game,
two ESS persist as outcomes of the game. These two limitations were overcome when Taylor
and Jonker (1978) introduced the replicator dynamics (RD) and its connection between the
static ESS and the dynamic concept of evolutionary equilibrium (EE). In symmetric two-
player games, every population state that is an ESS is asymptotically stable (i.e., an EE) in
the RD. Also, Bomze and Weibull (1995) showed that in symmetric two-player games, every
population state that is a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) is neutrally stable in the RD.
In this paper, we analyze all classes of symmetric games with two players and two strate-
gies allowing for two important dierences when compared to the general literature on both
deterministic and stochastic EGT found in several branches of science such as biology, physics,
economics and sociology. We assume both incomplete information and the existence of a het-
erogeneous population. Regarding the latter, in line with standard models on EGT, we con-
sider a single population which is split into subgroups of individuals programmed to play one
pure strategy. But, additionally, we assume that individuals in this population are randomly
assigned one of two possible types.
These ideas are the same originally proposed in I~ narra and Laruelle (2011) where they
study a static hawk-dove game with nite population and incomplete information in order
to provide theoretical support to the empirical results of Dennis et al. (2008). The latter
carries out an experiment with domestic fowls where the animals are randomly marked at the
back of their heads. Such a marking results in the individuals being able to identify the type
of their opponent (marked or unmarked) during a contest but they are not able to identify
their own type. We extend I~ narra and Laruelle (2011) by not restricting our attention to
the hawk-dove game. Instead we generalise the analysis to all classes of static games. We
consider a very large population and we extend the static analysis of the problem by modeling
it as a dynamic game using RD.
The importance of studying all classes of symmetric games assuming a heterogeneous
population stems from the fact that a vast literature on homogeneous population exists. In
many papers it is recognized the importance of extending the models to a heterogeneous
2population in further research. Examples of recent papers with homogeneous population can
be found in Ji and Xian-Jia (2011) where they study the evolution of a single homogeneous
nite population according to a Moran process considering also the possibility of mutations
during reproduction. They focus their study on the hawk-dove game and the coordination
game assuming dierent intensities of selection and dierent mutation rates. Xu et al. (2011)
study the eect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation in the homogeneous popula-
tion snowdrift game. In addition to the strategies to cooperate and to defeat, they include a
strategy to punish. A punisher is simply a cooperator who is willing to pay a cost and receive a
bit less payo in exchange to make a defector get even less. Platkowski and Zakrzewski (2011)
study the homogeneous population Rock-Paper-Scissors game using imitation dynamics and
assuming that strategies with higher attractiveness have a large likelihood to be imitated.
The attractiveness of a strategy follows a Cobb-Douglas utility function depending on the
payo of the strategy in the normal form game and its popularity, measured by its proportion
of adoption, among the population. We could bring several more examples without getting
close to exhaust the list of papers found in the literature.
In addition, there are also papers assuming two populations. Cressman et al. (1998) study
the evolutionary dynamics of crime assuming two types of individuals. But the framework is
dierent from ours because they consider two homogeneous populations, one of owners and
another of criminals. Individuals of one population only interact with individuals drawn from
the opponent population, ruling out own-population eects (see Friedman, 1998), that is, the
tness function of an individual depends only on the state of the opponent population.
In terms of results, our rst main contribution to the literature regards the static version of
the game. We show that, when both a heterogeneous population and incomplete information
exist, the only class of games in which the results dier from their classic homogeneous
versions with complete information is the anti-coordination game. In such class of games, the
only ESS vanishes when heterogeneity is added to the population. Instead we nd innite
NSS. For the classes of prisoner dilemma and coordination games, the number of ESS matches
in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous games. Also, any ESS in these two classes of
games consists of both players adopting the same pure action against any type of opponent
and this pure action matches with the ESS in the homogeneous game.
Our second contribution is related to the dynamic analysis. We show that in games with
heterogeneous populations and incomplete information the natural selection process can be
modeled using two dierent RD. Both dynamics lead to the same results. The rst RD follows
the standard literature and relies solely on pure strategies while the alternative RD relies on
both pure and mixed strategies. The strategies dene the two actions that an individual will
3adopt when contesting against the two dierent types of opponents. Throughout the paper,
the lack of complete information does not change the well established result that asymptotic
stability corresponds to evolutionary stable strategies while neutral stability is related to
neutrally stable strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the homogeneous games
with two players and two strategies with complete information and introduces the hetero-
geneous game with incomplete information. Section 3 gives the ESS. Section 4 reviews the
RD for homogeneous games and introduces two RD approaches for the heterogeneous games,
comparing their results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Homogeneous game versus heterogeneous game





We consider generic games, i.e., those such that a11 6= a21 and a22 6= a12. We can represent a
strategy by the probability of playing the rst strategy H. Let u(;) (respectively v(;))
be the expected payo of the row player (respectively the column player) when the row player
plays H with probability  (and D with probability 1   ) and the column player plays H
with probability  (and D with probability 1   ). We obtain
u(;) = a11 + (1   )a12 + (1   )a21 + (1   )(1   )a22
v(;) = u(;).
As the game is symmetric we need to keep track only of the payo function of one player
(say the row player). It can be rewritten as
u(;) = a21 + (1   )a22 + [(a1 + a2)   a2] (1)
with a1 = a11 a21 and a2 = a22 a12. As will be seen in the following, the solution concepts








4Denition 1 A matrix M is (i) dom when a1a2 < 0, (ii) coord when a1 > 0 and a2 > 0, or
(iii) anti when a1 < 0 and a2 < 0.
This is a complete classication of all 22 symmetric games as for generic games a1 6= 0
and a2 6= 0. For coord and anti matrices (for which a1 + a2 6= 0) we can dene a = a2
a1+a2. A
well-known example of game with a dom matrix is the prisoner dilemma, an example with

















hawk-dove (v < c)
We denote a game by  (M), and refer to it as the homogeneous game in the sense that
it is played among a homogeneous population.
By contrast we consider heterogeneous population, where the division of the population
into two types is done articially, and where individuals fail to recognize their own type but
do recognize their opponent's type. We extend I~ narra and Laruelle (2011)'s study of the
hawk-dove game in this context and see how it aects the evolutionarily stable strategies and
the replicator dynamics.
The population is divided into two types of individuals, I and II, where x (0 < x < 1) is
the proportion of individuals of type I. We assume that x is constant.1 Assuming that the
population is very large, at any bilateral encounter between two individuals the probabilities
of the four possible encounters, which we denote respectively by p(I;I), p(I;II), p(II;I) and
p(II;II), are given by
p(I;I) = x2, p(II;II) = (1   x)2, p(I;II) = p(II;I) = x(1   x): (2)
Any individual in the population can say \I know who you are but I do not know who
I am". She nds herself in a position of choosing a probability of playing H for each type
of opponent. But the strategy cannot depend on her own type. A strategy can thus be
represented by =(I;II) where I gives the probability of choosing H when facing an
opponent of type I, and II gives the probability of choosing H when facing an opponent of
type II. There are four pure strategies, HH where I = II = 1, DD where I = II = 0,
1In the dynamic process this corresponds to assuming that each new ospring is randomly assigned a type
in such a way that x does not change. The allocation of type is completely independent of the strategy the
ospring is programmed to play.
5DH where I = 0 and II = 1, and HD where I = 1 and II = 0. We denote by () the
frequency of playing action H:
() = xI + (1   x)II. (3)
Of course, 0  ()  1, the extreme values are reached for two of the pure strategies,
(HH) = 1 and (DD) = 0, while (HD) = x and (DH) = 1   x.
The expected payo of an individual playing =(I;II) while the opponent plays  =
(I;II) is the sum of the expected payos she would obtain in every possible encounter
weighted by its probability of occurrence. Therefore the expected payo of an individual
playing  against an opponent playing , that we denote by U(;), is given by
U(;) = p(I;I)u(I;I)+p(II;I)u(I;II)+p(I;II)u(II;I)+p(II;II)u(II;II).
Using (1), (2) and (3) we can rewrite
U(;) = [(a1 + a2)()   a2]() + g() (4)
where
g() = a22 + (a21   a22)().
We have all the ingredients of a game, hereafter referred to as a heterogeneous game and
denoted by  x(M), where 0 < x < 1 is the proportion of individuals of type I. We contrast
the results obtained in the homogeneous game  (M) with the ones in the heterogeneous one.
3 Evolutionarily stable strategies
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy that cannot be invaded by a mutant
strategy. An evolutionarily stable strategy has to be a best response2 to itself, and provides
a strictly larger payo than any strategy which is a best response to the evolutionarily stable
strategy. If the inequality is not strict the strategy is neutrally stable.
In the homogeneous game  (M), let B() denote the set of an individual's best responses
to an opponent playing strategy . The two conditions for a strategy  to be evolutionarily
stable in  (M) are: (1)  2 B() and (2) for any  2 B() such that  6=  we have
u(;) > u(;). A strategy  that satises Condition (1) and weakly satises Condition
(2), i.e., such that u(;)  u(;), is called a neutrally stable strategy (NSS).
2Given a strategy played by the opponent, a best response is a strategy that yields the highest payo.
6Proposition 1 Let  (M) be a homogeneous game. (i) If M is a dom matrix, there is a
unique ESS, which is a pure strategy (H if a1 > 0 and D if a1 < 0). (ii) If M is a coord
matrix, H and D are the two unique ESS. (iii) If M is an anti matrix, strategy a is the
unique ESS.
Proof. Let us rewrite (1) as
u(;) = a21 + (1   )a22 + [a1   (1   )a2].
(i) If M is a dom matrix, [a1   (1   )a2] is always strictly positive (if a1 > 0) or strictly
negative (if a1 < 0). It is clear then that there is a dominant pure strategy: H if a1 > 0
and D if a1 < 0. This strategy is an ESS as it satises Condition (1) while Condition (2)





[0;1] if  = a
f1g if  > a
f0g if  < a.
The three strategies that satisfy Condition (1) are  = 1,  = 0, and  = a. Condition (2)
becomes empty for the rst two strategies, while  = a does not satisfy Condition (2): for all
 6= a that are best response to strategy a the dierence u(a;)   u(;) should be strictly
positive. But there exists such  where
u(a;)   u(;) =  (a1 + a2)(   a)
2 < 0.





[0;1] if  = a
f1g if  < a
f0g if  > a.
Only strategy  = a satises Condition (1). It also satises Condition (2): the dierence
u(a;)   u(;) is strictly positive for any  6= a. Indeed
u(a;)   u(;) =  (a1 + a2)(   a)
2 > 0.
Hence  = a is the only ESS.
In the heterogeneous game  x(M), let Bx() denote the set of best responses to an
opponent playing strategy . We dene an ESS in the heterogeneous games as in I~ narra and
Laruelle (2011) by extending the denition of ESS in homogeneous games. That is,
Denition 2 Strategy  is evolutionarily stable in  x(M) if and only if (1)  2 Bx(),
and (2) for any  2 Bx() such that  6=  we have U(;) > U(;).
7From the equation of the expected payo (4) it is clear that the best response will depend
on (), and on the coecients a1 and a2. Note that the function g() plays no role. If
(a1+a2)() > a2, the best response is () = 1 (i.e., strategy HH), if (a1+a2)() < a2,
the best response is () = 0 (i.e., strategy DD), if (a1 + a2)() = a2, any strategy  is
a best response to . We have thus dierent ESS depending on the matrix as the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 2 Consider game  x(M). (i) If M is a dom matrix, there is only one ESS,
which is HH if a1 > 0, and DD if a1 < 0. (ii) If M is a coord matrix, HH and DD are the
only ESS. (iii) If M is an anti matrix, strategies ^  such that (^ ) = a are NSS.
Proof. (i) If M is a dom matrix, rewriting the equation of the expected payo (4) as
U(;) = [a1()   a2(1   ())]() + g()
we see that a1()   a2(1   ()) is always strictly positive (if a1 > 0) or strictly negative
(if a1 < 0). Thus there is one dominant strategy: HH (recall that (HH) = 1) if a1 > 0 or





[0;1]  [0;1] if () = a
f(1;1)g if () > a
f(0;0)g if () < a.
The strategies that satisfy Condition (1) are HH, DD, and all  such that () = a.
Condition (2) becomes empty for HH and DD, these two strategies are thus ESS. These
are the only ESS as Condition (2) is not satised for strategies . Indeed as all  are best
responses to , the dierence U(;)   U(;) should be strictly positive for any , and
any  6= . But it is easy to see that for all  there exists  6=   such that:
U(;)   U(;) =  (a1 + a2)(()   a)
2 < 0.





[0;1]  [0;1] if () = a
f(0;0)g if () > a
f(1;1)g if () < a.
Strategies b  such that (b ) = a satisfy Condition (1). For Condition (2) we compute
U(b ;)   U(;) =  (a1 + a2)(()   a)
2 .
8This dierence is strictly positive for any  such that () 6= a. But for 6=b  such that
() = a we have U(b ;)   U(;) = 0. Therefore, strategies b  such that (b ) = a are
NSS.
Comparing the results for homogeneous and heterogeneous games we obtain that the
probability of playing strategy H in  (M) is substituted by the frequency of playing action
H in  x(M). More precisely,  is an ESS in the homogeneous game if and only if  is
either an NSS or an ESS in the heterogeneous game, where  satises () = .
Theorem 1 Consider games  (M) and  x(M). (i) If  is an ESS or an NSS in game
 x(M), then () is an ESS in game  (M). (ii) If  is an ESS in game  (M) and
() =  has a unique solution , then  is an ESS in game  x(M). (iii) If  is an
ESS in game  (M) and () =  has multiple solutions, then all ^  such that (^ ) = 
are NSS in game  x(M)
Note that () =  has always at least one solution, the non-discriminating (with
respect to types) strategy  = (;). If it is the only solution, as for games with dom
and coord matrices then (;) is an ESS. If there are other solutions, as for games with
anti matrix, then all the solutions are NSS. The NSS such that b  6= (;) correspond to
discriminating strategies, when one type is discriminated with respect to the other type.
4 Replicator dynamics
The replicator dynamics study the stable state of the population. That is, it assumes that
the population is decomposed in subgroups, each of which playing pure strategies. Payos
represent the incremental eect from playing the game in question on an individual's tness,
measured as the number of ospring per time unit. It is also assumed that each ospring
inherits its parent's strategy - strategies breed true. The population state is the repartition of
the population into the dierent subgroups. The replicator dynamics looks for the repartitions
that are stable over time.
In the homogeneous game,  (M), there are two pure strategies, H and D. The total
population at time t, that we denote n(t), is decomposed into n(t) = nH(t) + nD(t) where
nH(t) is the number of individuals who are currently programmed to play strategy H and
nD(t) is the number of individuals who are currently programmed to play strategy D. A state
can simply be represented by the population share programmed to play strategy H that we
denote 
(t). In the following we will drop t and write nH = n
 and nD = n(1   
).
To see how the population share changes over time, we need to compute the payo
obtained with each pure strategy in state 
. It is immaterial for an individual whether she
9interacts with an individual drawn at random from a polymorphic population or with an
individual playing the mixed strategy 
. A random match when the population is in state 

is therefore equivalent to meeting an opponent playing 
. An individual playing H gets as
expected payo u(H;
) while an individual playing D gets u(D;
).
If reproduction takes place continuously over time, then the birthrate at any time t, of
individuals programmed to pure strategies, with dots for time derivation and suppressing
time arguments, results in the following population dynamics:





_ nD = nDu(D;




_ n = _ nH + _ nD = n[
u(H;





The equation relative to _ nD is redundant to study the evolution of the repartition into the
two subgroups of population. We keep the equation nH = n
 that we derive with respect to
time
n_ 
 = _ nH   










The evolution of the state 







We obtain a single equation.3 The conditions for a state 
 to be asymptotically stable are
(1) 
 is a critical point, that is, _ 
(






The following proposition gives the asymptotically stable states for a homogeneous game
depending on the matrix of the game.
Proposition 3 Let a homogeneous game  (M) with replicator dynamics (5). (i) If M is a
dom matrix, there is a unique asymptotically stable state, 
 = 1 if a1 > 0, and 
 = 0 if
a1 < 0. (ii) If M is a coord matrix, there are two asymptotically stable states, 

1 = 0 and


2 = 1. (iii) If M is an anti matrix, there is a unique asymptotically stable state, 
 = a.
3By contrast in the heterogeneous case we will obtain a system of equations.





   a2(1   
)].
If a1a2 < 0 the set of critical points is f0;1g, while it is f0;a;1g if a1a2 > 0. The second step












(1 + a)   a

if a1 + a2 6= 0
(2















The sign of the derivatives depends on the matrix. (i) If M is a dom matrix, 
 = 1 is
asymptotically stable if a1 > 0 and 
 = 0 is asymptotically stable if a1 < 0 (recall that a is
not a critical point). (ii) If M is a coord matrix, both 

1 = 0 and 

2 = 1 are asymptotically
stable while 
 = a is not. (iii) If M is an anti matrix, only 
 = a is asymptotically stable.
We proceed now to the heterogeneous game,  x(M). As the number of replicator dynamic
equations is based on the number of pure strategies, here we will have a system instead of a





_ 1 = f1(1;::;k)
:::
_ k = fk(1;::;k)
(6)
One condition is based on the Jacobian matrix of the system, which we denote 
() at state

















We will denote by 1 [
()];:::;k [
()] the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix 
(). The
eigenvalues can have an imaginary part, so Re[y] stands for the real part of y. The conditions
for a non linear system to be asymptotically stable in the neighborhood of a stationary state
are twofold.
Denition 3 The state  = (
1;::;
k) is locally asymptotically stable in the non linear
system (6) if the following two conditions are satised:
111. _ i() = 0 for i = 1;:::;k and
2. Re[i [
()]] < 0 for i = 1;:::;k.
The rst condition states that state  is stationary, while the second condition guarantees
that any trajectory of the system starting close enough to  will converge to  as t ! 1.
4.1 First RD approach
In game  x(M) there are four pure strategies, HH, HD, DH and DD. The population can
be decomposed into n = nHH +nHD +nDH +nDD, where nHH is the number of individuals
programmed to play HH, etc, with
nHH = nHH, nHD = nHD, nDH = nDH, and nDD = nDD. (7)
The population state is the repartition of the population into the dierent strategies that can
be represented by  =(HH;HD;DH) as DD = 1 HH  HD  DH. Graphically the set
of possible  is the tetrahedron showed in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Tetrahedron representing the state space.
The vertices of the tetrahedron correspond to a monomorphic population, i.e., only one
strategy (or genotype) survives in the population. Outside the vertices, the population is in
a polymorphic state, i.e., at least two strategies co-exist.
To construct the replicator dynamics we need the payo received when playing the pure
strategies. Preliminary to the question of the payo is the question of the strategy used by
an opponent drawn at random in state . If the population is in state , those who play HH
and those who play HD will play H when facing an individual of type I. Thus H against an
12individual of type I is played with probability HH + HD. Those who play HH and those
who play DH will play H against an opponent of type II. Thus H against an individual of
type II is played with probability HH +DH. In state  it is as if an individual was playing
against an opponent playing () = (HH + HD;HH + DH). Therefore if the individual
plays  the expected payo that she gets is U(;()) in state . The evolution of the
repartition of the population is thus given by
_ nHH = nHH U(HH;())
_ nHD = nHD U(HD;())
_ nDH = nDH U(DH;())
_ nDD = nDD U(DD;())
while the total population varies as
_ n = _ nHH + _ nHD + _ nDH + _ nDD = n U(();()).
The last equality is obtained by using (4) and (7).
Now we proceed to solve the system, dropping the equation relative to _ nDD as it is
redundant. We derive the equations in (7) to obtain
n_ HH = _ nHH   HH _ n = nHH [U(HH;())   U(();())]
n_ HD = _ nHD   HD _ n = nHD [U(HD;())   U(();())]
n_ DH = _ nDH   DH _ n = nDH [U(DH;())   U(();())].
Again substituting (4) into the previous equations we get
_ HH = HH [(a1 + a2)(())   a2][1   (())]
_ HD = HD [(a1 + a2)(())   a2][x   (())]
_ DH = DH [(a1 + a2)(())   a2][1   x   (())] (8)
where by (3)
(()) = (HH + HD;HH + DH) = HH + xHD + (1   x)DH.
We now study the dynamics of the system of equations given by (8). One should notice
that we can have zero eigenvalues at the vertices making these points non-hyperbolic. But
these are particular cases for specic values of the parameters x;a1 and a2. We ignore these
cases and focus the analysis on the cases where the system of ordinary dierential equations
is hyperbolic at all vertices of the tetrahedron. We carry out the analysis using Cartesian
coordinates instead of barycentric coordinates.
13Theorem 2 Let a heterogeneous game  x(M) with replicator dynamics (8). (i) If M is a
dom matrix, there is a unique asymptotically stable point, which is  = (1;0;0) if a1 > 0
and  = (0;0;0) if a1 < 0. (ii) If M is a coord matrix, there are two asymptotically
stable points: 
1=(1;0;0) and 
2=(0;0;0). (iii) If M is an anti matrix, there are innite
non-isolated neutrally stable points, all ~  such that ((~ )) = a.
Proof.
1. From (8) it is easy to see that the set of isolated critical points is: (0;0;0), (1;0;0),










@HH() @ _ HH
@HD() @ _ HH
@DH ()
@ _ HD
@HH() @ _ HD
@HD() @ _ HD
@DH()
@ _ DH
@HH() @ _ DH










() = (1   (()))[(a1 + a2)(())   a2]
+HH [(a1 + a2)(1   2(())) + a2]
@ _ HH
@HD
() = xHH [(a1 + a2)(1   2(())) + a2]
@ _ HH
@DH
() = (1   x)HH [(a1 + a2)(1   2(())) + a2]
@ _ HD
@HH
() = HD [(a1 + a2)(x   2(())) + a2]
@ _ HD
@HD
() = (x   (()))[(a1 + a2)(())   a2]
+xHD [(a1 + a2)(x   2(())) + a2]
@ _ HD
@DH
() = (1   x)HD [(a1 + a2)(x   2(())) + a2]
@ _ DH
@HH
() = DH [(a1 + a2)(1   x   2(())) + a2]
@ _ DH
@HD
() = xDH [(a1 + a2)(1   x   2(())) + a2]
@ _ DH
@DH
() = (1   x   (()))[(a1 + a2)(())   a2] +
+(1   x)DH [(a1 + a2)(1   x   2(())) + a2]








 a1  xa1  (1   x)a1







The eigenvalues are 1 [
(1;0;0)] =  a1, 2 [
(1;0;0)] =  (1 x)a1, and 3 [
(1;0;0)] =
 xa1. They have no imaginary part, and have all the same sign, negative if a1 > 0. If
M is a dom matrix with a1 > 0 or if M is a coord matrix, then (1;0;0) is asymptotically
stable. Similarly the eigenvalues of 
(0;1;0) are 1 [
(0;1;0)] = (1 x)(a1x+a2x a2),
2 [
(0;1;0)] =  x(a1x + a2x   a2), and 3 [
(0;1;0)] =  (a1x + a2x   a2). The
eigenvalues do not have the same sign. Thus (0;1;0) cannot be asymptotically stable.
The eigenvalues of 
(0;0;1) are 1 [
(0;0;1)] = x(a1   a1x   a2x), 2 [
(0;0;1)] =
 (1   2x)(a1   a1x   a2x), and 3 [
(0;0;1)] =  (1   x)(a1   a1x   a2x). The eigen-
values do not have the same sign. Thus (0;0;1) cannot be asymptotically stable. Fi-
nally the eigenvalues of 
(0;0;0) are 1 [
(0;0;0)] =  a2, 2 [
(0;0;0)] =  xa2, and
3 [
(0;0;0)] =  (1   x)a2. They have no imaginary part, and have all the same sign,
negative if a2 > 0 (i.e., a1 < 0). If M is a dom matrix with a1 < 0 or if M is a coord
matrix, then (0;0;0) is asymptotically stable.
2. The isolated critical points are the only critical points if M is a dom matrix, while
points ~  such that ((~ )) = a are also critical points if M is a coord matrix or
an anti matrix. The innite non-isolated critical points ~  are unstable when M is a
coord matrix and neutrally stable when M is an anti matrix. In the former case, when
the population is at state  such that (()) = a, any small shock would move the
population state away from  towards one of the sinks located either at (1;0;0) or
(0;0;0). In the latter case, when the population is at state , a shock would move the
population from state  to another state ' with ((')) = a close enough to ensure
stability (but thus violating asymptotic stability).
Graphically the points ~  form a plane  that does not intersect the interior of the tetrahe-
dron if M is a dom matrix but does otherwise. Based on the analysis of the eigenvalues above,
when plane  does not cross the tetrahedron, there is necessarily one single asymptotically
stable vertice (which is an evolutionary equilibrium) and one single unstable vertice, while
the remaining two vertices act like saddles but in R3. The latter are (0;1;0) and (0;0;1)
15for any M. When M is a dom matrix with a1 > 0, the asymptotically stable vertice is
(1;0;0) while (0;0;0) is unstable and vice-versa when a1 < 0. Both (1;0;0) and (0;0;0) are
asymptotically stable for a coord matrix and unstable for an anti matrix.
When plane  does intercept the tetrahedron, the latter becomes divided in two subspaces,
S1 and S2, in such a way that (1;0;0) 2 S1 and (0;0;0) 2 S2. To view this, at the edge of
the tetrahedron HHDD we have both HD = DH = 0.  crosses this edge at the point
HH = a. Given a 2 (0;1) for both cases when M is either a coord or an anti matrix, 
separates (1;0;0) and (0;0;0) into two dierent subspaces.
4.2 Second RD approach
An alternative way to construct a replicator dynamics in an heterogeneous game  x(M) is
to split the n individuals into two subgroups for each type of opponent: the individuals who




I is the number of individuals who play H when facing an opponent of type I and
nD
I refers to the subgroup of individuals who play D when facing an opponent of type I.
But we can also divide the population into two subgroups with respect to their behaviour
when contesting against a type II opponent. Following the same reasoning and notation,
n = nH
II + nD







I = n(1   
I) nD
II = n(1   
II).
The population state is the repartition of the population into the pure action H against each




In this approach the strategy played by an opponent drawn at random in state 
 is simply

, it is as if the opponent played H against an individual of type I with probability 
I and
an individual of type II with probability 
II.
As the pure actions are only specied for one type of opponent, we have to specify what
is done against the other type. Here we assume that the individual, when facing the other
type behaves as an average individual.
If reproduction takes place continuously over time, then the birthrate at any time t of




















_ n = _ nH
I + _ nD
I _ n = _ nH
II + _ nD
II
Substituting (4) into _ n = _ nH
I + _ nD
I we obtain
_ n = n[
I U((H;
II);
) + (1   
I) U((D;
II);
)] = n U(
;
)
In order to obtain _ 
I we derive nH
I = n
I to obtain n_ 
I = _ nH
I   




II _ n. Using (4),
n_ 
I = _ nH
I   

















We proceed similarly for _ 
II and obtain respectively
_ 





II = [(a1 + a2)(
)   a2]
II(1   
II)(1   x). (9)
Note that at the limit case, when x = 0, the system reduces to _ 





II   a2], the last equation being the replicator dynamics of the homogeneous
population game. The other limit case (x = 1) is similar with _ 
II = 0.
The following theorem gives the stable states for a heterogeneous game depending on the
matrix of the game, based on the second model of replicator dynamics.
Theorem 3 Let a heterogeneous game  x(M) with replicator dynamics (9). (i) If M is a
dom matrix, there is a unique asymptotically stable point, which is 
 = (1;1) if a1 > 0 and

 = (0;0) if a1 < 0. (ii) If M is a coord matrix, there are two asymptotically stable points:


1 = (1;1) and 

2 = (0;0). (iii) If M is an anti matrix, there are innite non-isolated
neutrally stable points, all ~ 
 such that (~ 
) = a.
Proof. Analyzing system (9), the system has always four isolated critical points: (1;0),





































) = x(1   2
I)[(a1 + a2)(
























) = (1   x)(1   2
II)[(a1 + a2)(
)   a2] + 
II(1   
II)(1   x)
2 (a1 + a2)
The Jacobian matrix 
 evaluated at the critical point (1;1), 
(1;1), gives the eigenvalues

(1;1)
i = f xa1; (1   x)a1g, having both the same signs, and are negative if a1 > 0. Thus
(1;1) is an asymptotically stable point if a1 > 0. 
(0;0) leads to 
(0;0)
i = f xa2; (1   x)a2g.
The eigenvalues have the same signs, and are negative if a2 > 0 (i.e., a1 < 0). Thus (0;0)




i = f x(xa1 + xa2   a2);(1   x)(xa1 + xa2   a2)g, hence the eigenvalues have opposite




i = fx(a1   xa1   xa2); (1   x)(a1   xa1   xa2)g. If M is a dom matrix the isolated
critical points are the only critical points, while points ~ 
 such that (~ 
) = a are also critical
points if M is a coord matrix or an anti matrix. Graphically the points ~ 
 form a straight
line  with innite non-isolated critical points that does not intersect the interior of the
[0;1]  [0;1] square if M is a dom matrix but does otherwise. Moreover, when M is a coord
matrix, _ 
I > 0 and _ 
II > 0 hold in the region of the [0;1]  [0;1] square where (
) > a
and the vector eld necessarily converges to the corner (1;1) as t ! 1. On the other hand,
when (
) < a, we have _ 
I < 0 and _ 
II < 0 and the vector eld converges to the corner
(0;0) as t ! 1. When M is an anti matrix, the vector eld 
ows in the opposite direction
as described above and converges to the critical points along the straight line  when t ! 1.
The critical points along (~ 
) = a are thus neutrally stable.
These stability patterns can be seen in gure 2. Linking the results of this section with
those of section 3, we obtain the following result for heterogeneous games whose proof is
omitted.
Proposition 4 Let a game  x(M). A strategy  is an ESS i the state  is an asymp-
totically stable state in replicator dynamics (9). A strategy  is an NSS i the state  is
a neutrally stable state in replicator dynamics (9).
The above proposition means that a well established result in the literature can be ex-
tended for heterogeneous games with incomplete information regarding the players' own type
18Figure 2: from left to right: dynamics for the cases when M is a dom matrix (a1 < 0), coord
matrix and anti matrix.
and symmetric two-strategy pairwise contests.4
4.3 Comparison between the two RD approaches



















Proof. It is easy to check that given that all coecients are non-negative and smaller or
equal to 1, we have  = (1;0;0) i 
 = (1;1),  = (0;1;0) i 
 = (1;0),  = (0;0;1) i

 = (0;1),  = (0;0;0) i 
 = (0;0). Moreover () = 
. In consequence (()) = a
i (
) = a.
The proposition above links both approaches of replicator dynamics, showing that the
population evolves to the same asymptotically (neutrally) stable states, independently of
which replicator dynamics setup is used. In the rst model, the individual inherits a clearly
dened behaviour toward both types of opponents (pure actions when contesting against
both types I or II). On the other hand, in the second model, the natural selection was
modeled using an inheritance mechanism in which individuals inherit a strategy according
to which the behaviour against one type of opponent is well dened (a pure action H or D)
but the behaviour against the other type is undened (the individual randomizes her action).
For example, an individual inherits the H behaviour against a type I opponent while the
behaviour toward a type II opponent is random.
4See Taylor and Jonker (1978) and Bomze and Weibull (1995).
195 Conclusion
In this paper we studied evolutionary stability in all classes of two person symmetric games
with two strategies, two possible types of individuals and incomplete information with respect
to their own type. We called such games heterogeneous games in contrast with the well known
homogeneous version with complete information in which all individuals in the population
are of the same type. We started with static evolutionary games and then extended the study
to the use of replicator dynamics.
We showed that the only class of such games in which the results dier from their classic
homogeneous versions with complete information is the class of anti-coordination games.
The latter is the only class of game in which the condition for evolutionary stable strategies
vanishes. Instead, we found innite NSS.
We also showed that in such games of incomplete information, the natural selection process
can be modeled using two dierent replicator dynamics setups. The rst setup relies on
an inheritance mechanism solely based on pure strategies while the alternative replicator
dynamics relies on both pure and mixed strategies. The strategies dene the two actions
that an individual will adopt when contesting against the two dierent types of opponents.
Both dynamics lead to the same results.
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